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Note
Requiring Unwanted Habeas Corpus Petitions to
State Supreme Courts for Exhaustion Purposes:
Too Exhausting
Matthew L. Anderson
"[it is state remedies that are to be exhausted, not state prisoners."1
Freddie Richardson, a state prisoner in Texas, unsuccess-
fully appealed his criminal conviction through the Texas state
courts' direct appeal system.2 Relegated to launching a collat-
eral attack on the judgment, Richardson filed a petition for
habeas corpus3 in federal district court three years after his
1. Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus:
An Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 Omo ST. L.J. 393, 441 (1983)
(citing Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
2. Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 429 (5th Cir. 1985). A Texas
district court convicted Richardson on January 14, 1981, for aggravated rob-
bery. Id. On appeal, Richardson argued that his conviction rested on evidence
gathered during an illegal arrest and on unduly suggestive pretrial identifica-
tion. Id. at 430. The Court of Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District
of Texas, the final court available to Richardson as a matter of right in Texas's
direct appeal process, affirmed his conviction. Id. at 429-30 (describing state's
criminal appeals procedure).
After a conviction is rendered final on direct appeal, a prisoner can only
collaterally attack the conviction by challenging the legality of the prisoner's
confinement, not the prisoner's guilt or innocence. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
CouRrs, HABEAS CoRPus IN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs I & n.2 (1994). Typi-
cally, after the conviction is rendered final, a state offers the prisoner the oppor-
tunity to petition the state court as a matter of right for post-conviction or
habeas corpus relief. If denied, the prisoner can then request the state's high-
est court to exercise its powers of discretionary review to hear the claims. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1991) (describing prisoner's
procedural path after final judgment in Virginia); Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d
381, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing prisoner's procedural path after final judg-
ment in Minnesota), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995). In Richardson's case,
Texas did not offer an appeal as a matter of right after final judgment was en-
tered, but instead offered only an appeal for discretionary review from the
state's highest court. Richardson, 762 F.2d at 430 (describing state's criminal
appeals process).
3. A petition for federal habeas corpus relief is a civil suit available to
persons claiming that the state has detained them in violation of constitutional
or federal law. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 & n.34 (1963), overruled on
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original conviction.4 Richardson, however, had failed to petition
the state's highest court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
for its purely discretionary review.5 Despite the discretionary
nature of the state court's review, the federal district court dis-
missed Richardson's petition for failing to exhaust state reme-
dies before requesting federal relief.6 A year later, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal.7
The Fifth Circuit sent Richardson's case back to the Texas court
system without analyzing the state court's interest in re-hearing
his claims, the judicial system's interest in efficiency, or Rich-
ardson's interest in speedy relief.8
Whether another federal court would review a case like
Richardson's depends largely on how strictly the court inter-
prets the exhaustion doctrine of habeas corpus. 9 This doctrine,
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254,10 directs federal courts to refuse to
consider habeas petitions from state prisoners until the prison-
other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72(1977); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 2, at 1. The suit is a
collateral attack on the state court's otherwise final judgment. Id. at 1 n.2.
Types of relief available in federal court include ordering the resentencing of
the prisoner, reclassifying the prisoner's conviction, or granting a retrial. Jo-
seph Turitz & John van Loben Sels, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 82 GEo.
L.J. 1300, 1344 (1994). As a last resort, a federal court may order the uncondi-
tional release of the prisoner. Id. at 1344-45.
4. Richardson, 762 F.2d at 430. Richardson filed his federal habeas
corpus petition on February 29, 1984. Id.
5. Id. Despite his failure to petition the state's highest court for discre-
tionary review, Richardson had raised the same claims on direct review of his
conviction as those he raised in his petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Id.
The state courts, therefore, had an opportunity to hear Richardson's claims.
6. Id. Unlike the first appeal on direct review, the review by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals is not a matter of right. Id. (citing Tnx. R. CRnm.
App. P. 302(b)).
7. Id.
8. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Richardson's petition solely on the basis of
his failure to petition the state court for discretionary review. Id. at 429-32.
9. Whether the federal court reviews a case like Richardson's also de-
pends on state law. This Note focuses on procedural situations where an appeal
to the state's highest court for discretionary review is not time barred.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) provides in part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an ab-
sence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
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ers have exhausted all state remedies. 1' Although exhaustion of
state remedies is a well-established condition precedent to state
prisoners' seeking federal relief,'2 federal courts disagree as to
what constitutes "exhaustion of state remedies" sufficient to al-
low federal court review.' 3 In particular, the courts differ on
whether the exhaustion doctrine requires a state prisoner to file
a petition for discretionary post-conviction relief with the state's
supreme court 14 before requesting review from a federal court.'
5
This Note encourages the federal courts to adopt a guided,
flexible approach to determine when the availability of discre-
tionary state supreme court review requires dismissal of federal
habeas petitions from state prisoners. Part I describes the de-
velopment of the exhaustion doctrine and outlines previous at-
tempts by federal courts to address whether they must require
prisoners to petition state supreme courts for discretionary re-
view. Part IE critiques the federal courts' attempts to address
this issue and asserts that many federal decisions undermine
the foundations of the exhaustion doctrine by diminishing state
courts' interests, judicial efficiency, and prisoners' patience and
resources. Part Ill proposes a guided approach that relies on the
federal courts' exercise of discretion to balance and advance the
various goals of the exhaustion doctrine. This approach serves
the interests of federal courts, state courts, and state prisoners
section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 136 (1987) (unanimous) (re-
ferring to the "the general rule of exhaustion); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,
275 (1971) (stating that requiring exhaustion of state remedies has been settled
since 1886).
13. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 546 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting federal courts' confusion regarding habeas corpus); see also JAMES
S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 310 (Supp. 1993) (noting uncertainty among federal courts regarding
habeas corpus).
14. Although states' highest courts often have different names, this Note
refers to the state's highest court as the state supreme court unless discussing a
particular state court by name.
15. See Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381,383-84 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting disa-
greement among circuit courts on this issue), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995);
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 13, at 310 (describing majority view that prisoner
need not pursue discretionary state appellate review). Some courts require pe-
titioners to seek discretionary relief in state court even if it is highly likely that
the state court will deny relief. See, e.g., Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308,
1311 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring habeas petitioner to return to state court even
though state supreme court had expressed lack of interest in habeas petitions).
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better than a rigid, mechanical rule requiring prisoners to peti-
tion state supreme courts in all instances.
I. HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF AND THE EVOLUTION OF
THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The framers of the Constitution regarded habeas corpus,
often described as the "Great Writ,"16 as an important restraint
on government power. Accordingly, they ensured that it re-
ceived constitutional protection: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 17 Origi-
nally, the writ of habeas corpus was available in federal courts
only to federal prisoners,18 but in 1867 Congress extended the
federal courts' power to grant habeas relief to state prisoners. 19
The writ of habeas corpus provided the only federal remedy
available to state prisoners incarcerated in violation of the
United States Constitution.20 In 1886, the Supreme Court mod-
16. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-403 (1963) (describing habeas
corpus), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct.
1715 (1992), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Turitz & van Loben Sels, supra note 3, at 1300
n.2711 (same).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
18. Fay, 372 U.S. at 409. Through the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
granted the federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal
prisoners, not to state prisoners. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
19. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988)); Fay, 372 U.S. at 409.
20. Turitz & van Loben Sels, supra note 3, at 1300-01. Acknowledging
that in form habeas corpus is merely a "mode of procedure," Justice Brennan
described the history of habeas corpus as "inextricably intertwined" with the
development of personal liberty:
For its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy
for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root princi-
ple is that in a civilized society, government must always be accounta-
ble to the judiciary for a [person's] imprisonment: [1f the
imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fimdamental re-
quirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.
Fay, 372 U.S. at 401-02.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the writ of habeas corpus technically extends to
violations of federal law in addition to constitutional violations:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a dis-
trict court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). Nevertheless, the courts still require "allegations
... of a substantial constitutional denial," even for federal prisoners. Fay, 372
U.S. at 412.
[Vol. 79:11971200
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ified state prisoners' right to seek federal habeas corpus relief by
establishing the exhaustion requirement,21 which instructed
federal courts to refrain from ruling on habeas claims until state
courts had ruled on them. Congress codified this requirement in
1948.22 Today, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 instructs a federal court to re-
fuse a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief "unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State."23 A court must find that a prisoner
has not exhausted state remedies "if [the prisoner] has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented."2 '
Despite the definitive language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal
courts have never regarded the doctrine as limiting their juris-
diction over habeas petitions.25 Habeas petitions inherently
concern issues of federal law.2 6 By retaining jurisdiction, fed-
eral courts ensure uniformity in federal law.2 7 Because federal
courts always retain jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions,
exhaustion creates only a question of timing. Thus, the exhaus-
tion doctrine determines not whether, but when a federal court
21. Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,251-52 (1886) (instructing federal courts
to refrain from ruling on habeas claims until state courts could rule on them);
see also Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (noting exhaustion require-
ment declared in Royall); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (same); Fay,
372 U.S. at 418 (same); Lawrence D. Levit, Habeas Corpus and the Exhaustion
Doctrine: Daye Lights Dark Corner of the Law, 50 BRooK. L. REv. 565, 568
(describing exhaustion requirement created by courts as a "prudential curb on
the exercise of judicial power"). In Royall, a state prisoner appealed to the fed-
eral courts for habeas corpus relief before the state courts had brought him to
trial. 117 U.S. at 245. The Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction over
state prisoners' petitions for habeas corpus simply because the prisoner is in
custody under the authority of the state, but that federal courts should exercise
forbearance and avoid interfering with a state court's process. Id. at 252-53.
The Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the prisoner's petition be-
cause the circuit court would not have granted relief even if it knew it had juris-
diction. Id. at 254.
22. Currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). See Castille, 489 U.S. at
349 (noting codification in 1948); Rose, 455 U.S. at 515 (same). Congress "sim-
ply codified the common law." Lawrence S. Hirsh, Note, State Waiver of the
Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Cases, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 419,
422 (1984).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988).
24. Id. § 2254(c).
25. Castille, 489 U.S. at 349 (noting that exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional, but presumes prisoner must exhaust state remedies); Granberry
v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987); Fay, 372 U.S. at 418.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
27. Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
999, 1022 (1985) (emphasizing importance of retaining federal forum for habeas
petitions).
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will consider a habeas corpus petition.28 A federal court, there-
fore, uses the underlying purposes of the exhaustion doctrine to
support its approach for determining when to consider petitions
from state prisoners.
A. TiE EXHAUSTION Doc=nE's UNDERLYING PURPOSES:
COMITY AND JUDIcIAL EFFICmNCY
Originally, the Supreme Court intended the exhaustion re-
quirement to provide for federal and state courts what comity
provided for foreign nations: namely, respect for each other's
authority and interests. 29 Requiring exhaustion of state reme-
dies furthers state court interests by ensuring that state courts
retain a role in interpreting and enforcing federal law,3 0 by pro-
tecting the federal and state judicial systems from unnecessary
friction,31 and by promoting finality of state court judgments.32
In addition, by requiring state habeas petitioners to bring fed-
eral claims in state courts, the exhaustion requirement encour-
ages state courts to become familiar with and knowledgeable
about federal law.33
Historically, the Supreme Court gave the federal writ of
habeas corpus for state prisoners an extremely broad interpreta-
tion.34 In the Court's view, the writ provided the federal courts
with the authority to hear state prisoners' claims at any time,
and to grant relief for any constitutional violations regardless of
28. Fay, 372 U.S. at 418 ("This qualification plainly stemmed from consid-
eration of comity rather than power, and envisaged only the postponement, not
the relinquishment, of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction."); Yackle, supra note
27, at 1050 ("Properly conceived, exhaustion determines only the timing of a
habeas petition; it has nothing to do with the federal courts' subject matter ju-
risdiction."); Yackle, supra note 1, at 393.
29. Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (per curiam);Exparte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886); see Castille, 489 U.S. at 349; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.
255, 268-69 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Fay, 372 U.S. at 418; Hirsh,
supra note 22, at 420, 422, 423, 427; Levit, supra note 21, at 567-68.
30. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Hirsh, supra note 22, at 421-
22.
31. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518; Hirsh, supra note 22, at 421-22.
32. See Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure
for a Simple Process, 77 MJNN. L. REv. 1015, 1016 (1993) (noting problem of
delays that exist before finality of criminal judgments).
33. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.
34. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963) (discussing historical perception
that courts should broadly construe the legislation granting federal courts'
power to hear habeas petitions from state prisoners), overruled on other
grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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the states' laws or procedures. 35 Because the writ could poten-
tially intrude into state courts and state criminal justice sys-
tems,36 the Supreme Court created the self-imposed exhaustion
requirement.3 7 The Court, however, regarded the exhaustion
requirement as flexible and discretionary.38 Writing for the
Court in Hensley v. Municipal Court,3 9 Justice Brennan empha-
sized the Court's commitment to maintaining the flexibility of
habeas corpus: "[W]e have consistently rejected interpretations
of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in sti-
fling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of
arcane and scholastic procedural requirements. The demand for
speed, flexibility, and simplicity is clearly evident in our deci-
sions concerning the exhaustion doctrine ... . 4o Most impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court viewed the exhaustion requirement
as a tool available to federal courts for the benefit of state
35. Id.
36. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 267 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to federal habeas as an "intrusion into state affairs"); id. at 282 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ('[F]ederal habeas review itself . . intrudes on state sover-
eignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority."); Ex
parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (per curiam) (noting that federal court
activities in habeas corpus "interfere with the administration of justice in the
state courts"); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886) (noting "unseemly" ap-
pearance of federal judges setting prisoners free after conviction by state
courts). But see Fay, 372 U.S. at 440 (noting that the "availability... of habeas
corpus in the federal courts for persons in the custody of the States offends no
legitimate state interest in the enforcement of criminal justice or procedure").
37. Royall, 117 U.S. at 251; see also Levit, supra note 21, at 567-70 & n.26
(discussing Supreme Court's role in development of exhaustion doctrine).
38. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 136 (1987) (unanimous) (noting that
general requirement of exhaustion of state remedies is not rigid and inflexible);
Fay, 372 U.S. at 438 ("[D]iscretion was the flexible concept employed by the
federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule."); Royall, 117 U.S. at 251 (not-
ing that federal court's discretion is guided by relations between federal and
state courts). But see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding "that a
district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and
exhausted claims"); id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
adopting an "inflexible, mechanical rule").
39. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
40. Id. at 350.
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courts4 1 that would ease any tensions created by the Great
Writ's intrusiveness. 42
The Supreme Court also intended the exhaustion doctrine
to increase judicial efficiency. 43 By requiring exhaustion of state
remedies, federal courts encourage state courts to make, de-
velop, and document factual and legal findings involved in pris-
oners' petitions. 44 In addition, requiring exhaustion fosters an
orderly process for habeas appeals by forcing prisoners to pursue
all the remedies in one forum before pursuing remedies in an-
other and by allowing prisoners to make only one transition be-
tween the two forums.45 Moreover, as prisoners work through
the process, they may abandon habeas claims if state courts pro-
vide sufficient relief, or they may refine and clarify their habeas
petitions through additional state court appeals, thereby reduc-
ing or eliminating the federal courts' duties.46 Judicial effi-
ciency benefits state and federal courts47 as well as prisoners,
41. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (unanimous) (stating
that the exhaustion doctrine is rooted in the desire of federal courts to protect
the state courts' role in developing and interpreting federal law); see also Rose,
455 U.S. at 518-19 (noting exhaustion doctrine's underlying principle of protect-
ing state courts' role in developing federal law). The Court in Rose v. Lundy
argued that state courts benefit from federal courts "rigorously enforc[ing a]
total exhaustion rule" because rigorous enforcement gives state courts the first
opportunity to review claims of constitutional mistakes, allowing state courts to
become more familiar and comfortable with constitutional issues. 455 U.S. at
518-19.
42. See Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam); Satter-
white v. Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Carter v. Es-
telle, 677 F.2d 427, 441 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The exhaustion requirement was the
response to an inevitable tension between state and federal interests created by
the historical importance of the Great Writ.... ."), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056
(1983).
43. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 (noting that state courts create complete factual records
that facilitate federal review).
44. Harris, 489 U.S. at 269 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rose, 455 U.S.
at 518-19).
45. LmEBAN & HERTZ, supra note 13, at 299-300 (discussing efficiency the-
ories of exhaustion doctrine).
46. Id. In addition, the exhaustion doctrine could deplete the prisoner's
resources, patience, or desire before reaching federal court, thereby relieving
the federal courts' duties.
47. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519-20 (noting judicial efficiency interests in ex-
haustion considerations); Laura S. Schnell, Comment, State Waiver and Forfei-
ture of the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Actions, 50 U. Cm. L.
REv. 354, 366-68 (1983) (noting judicial concern over resources consumed in
reviewing habeas corpus petitions); see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 269 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe rule furthers the interest in the efficiency of
federal habeas corpus, by assuring that, in general, the factual and legal bases
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who prefer to have their claims heard and resolved as quickly as
possible.48
Finally, some federal courts enforce the exhaustion require-
ment because they perceive that state prisoners inundate fed-
eral courts with frivolous habeas petitions49 (even though the
proportion of federal habeas petitions from state prisoners has
actually decreased since 1968).50 The image of federal courts
flooded with meritless petitions, coupled with certain justifica-
tions for the exhaustion requirement, has led some federal
courts to interpret the exhaustion requirement as a strict bar-
rier to federal relief.5 '
B. APPROACHES TO ENFORCiNG THE EXHAUSTION DocTRiNE
Federal courts repeatedly face a difficult issue: to what ex-
tent must a state prisoner exhaust state remedies before seeking
federal habeas corpus relief?52 The federal courts look to the
Supreme Court, as well as to the underlying purposes of the ex-
haustion doctrine, to determine whether a particular petition
surrounding a petitioner's constitutional claim or claims will have been devel-
oped in a prior adjudication.").
48. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 (The prisoner's principal interest, of course,
is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims."). The exhaustion require-
ment, however, often increases the number of litigation steps a prisoner must
take before resolution of his claims and thus delays the remedy of constitutional
violations. LEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 13, at 299 n31. For some prisoners,
however, particularly those on death row, prolonging the process furthers their
interests in putting off execution. See Norlynn Blocker, Comment, An Exercise
in Comity: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceed-
ings, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 497, 508 (1983).
49. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 282 n.6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting
number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners).
50. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs, supra note 2, at 10-11, 13-14. In
1968 there were 168,211 state prisoners in the United States. Id. at 14. That
same year the federal courts received approximately 6500 petitions for habeas
corpus relief from state prisoners. Id. By 1989, the state prison population had
nearly quadrupled to 653,392, yet the number of habeas petitions from state
prisoners only increased to approximately 10,500. Id. Had the number of peti-
tions increased proportionately with the state prison population, the federal
courts would have received over 27,000 petitions in 1989.
51. See, e.g., Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 ("Rather than increasing the burden on
federal courts, strict enforcement of the exhaustion requirement will encourage
habeas petitioners to exhaust all of their claims in state court. . . ."); see also
Lay, supra note 32, at 1018 ("[Tihe Court has ... created procedural hurdles
that make the writ less accessible to litigants . . . ."); Yackle, supra note 1, at
394 ("[Tlhe federal courts' discretion in exhaustion cases is gradually being re-
placed by a set of rigid rules .... ").
52. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1989) (quoting Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977)).
1995] 1205
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1197
has sufficiently fulfilled the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The federal courts have taken varying approaches to this issue.
1. The Supreme Court's Approaches to the Exhaustion
Doctrine: Rigidity and Flexibility
When faced with exhaustion doctrine issues, the Supreme
Court has acted inconsistently, demonstrating both a willing-
ness to enforce the exhaustion doctrine with mechanical rigid-
ity53 and a commitment to retaining flexibility and discretion in
enforcing the exhaustion rule.54 In 1981, the Supreme Court
rigidly enforced the exhaustion doctrine in Duckworth v. Ser-
rano.55 In Duckworth, the prisoner failed to present his consti-
tutional claim to the state courts. 56 The Seventh Circuit,
however, refused to dismiss the petition on exhaustion grounds
because "in view of the clear violation of [the prisoner's] rights
and in the interest of judicial economy, there was no reason to
await the state court's consideration of the issue."5 7 The
53. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8 (1982) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that state remedies were not exhausted through direct appeals process even
though Sixth Circuit found that prisoner's constitutional arguments "were
self-evident'" to state courts (quoting Harless v. Anderson, 664 F.2d 610, 612
(6th Cir. 1982))); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22 (holding that federal courts must
dismiss habeas petitions from state prisoners containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims unless the prisoner deletes the unexhausted claims at the
risk of forfeiting them); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (per curiam)
(refusing to allow federal courts to dismiss unexhausted habeas petitions even
though prisoner's incarceration results from "obvious constitutional errors"); see
also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("T]he Court today continues its crusade to erect petty procedural barriers
in the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal [habeas corpus]
claims."); Lawrence Herman, Foreword: Errors of Comity?, 44 Omo ST. L.J.
269, 270 & n.12 (1983) (citing Rose as exemplifying Supreme Court's narrowing
of federal habeas corpus); Yackle, supra note 27, at 994 & n.15 (providing pre-
Rose v. Lundy examples of procedural barriers the Court erected to impede
state prisoners' access to federal habeas corpus).
54. See, e.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 134 (1987) (unani-
mous) (holding that federal appellate court has discretion to refuse state prose-
cutor's defense on grounds of nonexhaustion when that defense was not raised
in the district court); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1973)
(noting the Court's commitment to maintaining the exhaustion doctrine's flexi-
bility); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1952) (unanimous) ("[The ex-
haustion doctrine] is not rigid and inflexible; district courts may deviate from it
and grant relief in special circumstances."); cf Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting federal courts' duty to "assess the like-
lihood" that state court would hear the prisoner's habeas claim when determin-
ing availability of state court remedies).
55. 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. (quotations omitted).
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Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that fed-
eral courts should not make exceptions to the exhaustion doc-
trine even for "obvious constitutional errors." 8
The Supreme Court's 1982 decision, Rose v. Lundy,59 epito-
mized this rigid approach. 60 In Rose, the Supreme Court in-
structed federal courts to dismiss state habeas corpus petitions
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.61 The
Court stated that strict enforcement of the exhaustion require-
ment furthered the purposes of exhaustion, and promoted the
various state, federal, and prisoner interests involved, by provid-
ing state courts with ample opportunity to correct constitutional
violations and by ensuring consolidation of prisoners' multiple
claims.62
58. Id. at 4.
59. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
60. See id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The inflexible, mechanical rule
the Court adopts today arbitrarily denies district judges the kind of authority
they need .... ."). In Rose, the majority supported "[a] rigorously enforced total
exhaustion rule," id. at 518, that required a federal court to dismiss a prisoner's
entire petition if it contained any unexhausted claims. Id. at 522. A federal
court cannot, therefore, address a petitioner's claims that have been exhausted
if they are in a petition with unexhausted claims.
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court's decision for using the exhaustion
doctrine "as 'a blunderbuss to shatter the attempt at litigation of constitutional
claims.'" Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bra-
den v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,490 (1973)). Justice Blackmun
further argued that "the 'total exhaustion! rule... operates as a trap for the
uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant; that it delays the resolution
of claims that are not frivolous; and that it tends to increase, rather than to
alleviate, the caseload burdens on both state and federal courts." Id. at 522.
Likewise, Justice Stevens criticized the consequences of the Court's
decision:
If my appraisal of respondent's exhausted claims is incorrect-if the
trial actually was fundamentally unfair to the respondent-postponing
relief until another round of review in the state and federal judicial
systems has been completed is truly outrageous. The unnecessary de-
lay will make it more difficult for the prosecutor to obtain a conviction
on retrial if respondent is in fact guilty; if he is innocent, requiring him
to languish in jail because he made a pleading error is callous indeed.
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Yackle, supra note 1, at 425-27 (ar-
guing that "[nione of [the majority's] arguments justifies the total exhaustion
rule").
It is important to note that the Court's approach in Rose concerns a situa-
tion where the state raised the exhaustion defense, 455 U.S. at 513, as opposed
to the Court's approach in Granberry v. Greer, where the state failed to raise, or
chose not to raise, the exhaustion defense. 481 U.S. 129, 130 (1987).
61. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.
62. Id. at 518-22; see also supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing underlying purposes of exhaustion doctrine). In Rose, the Court rea-
soned that a "rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule" provides state courts
with every possible opportunity to correct a constitutional error. 455 U.S. at
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In the same year the Supreme Court decided Rose, it also
decided Anderson v. Harless.63 In Anderson, both the federal
district court and the Sixth Circuit found that the state prisoner
exhausted state claims for habeas relief through direct appeal of
his conviction, even though the prisoner could have collaterally
attacked his conviction in state court.64 Both courts concluded
that the prisoner had adequately presented the issue to the
state courts because his habeas claims were "'self-evident'" in
his direct state court appeal.65 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the "self-evident" nature of his claims and found that
the prisoner had not exhausted state remedies because state
procedures allowed him to present his claims in state court.66
Despite the Court's apparently rigid approach in Rose and
Anderson, in other cases the Court has committed itself to the
exhaustion doctrine's roots of flexibility. Even in Rose, the Court
acknowledged the intended discretionary and flexible nature of
the exhaustion doctrine.67 In fact, the Court relied on Rose in
Granberry v. Greer,68 in which the Court emphatically rein-
forced the federal courts' power to exercise discretion when con-
sidering the exhaustion requirement.69 Specifically, the Court
518-19. In addition, the Court believed that strictly enforcing the exhaustion
doctrine would promote judicial efficiency by forcing a prisoner to consolidate
his claims into one federal petition accompanied by a complete factual record
developed through the state-court process. Id. at 519-20; see also supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text (discussing judicial efficiency benefits of exhaus-
tion doctrine). Finally, the Court considered the state prisoner's interests in
speedy relief and concluded that strictly enforcing the exhaustion requirement
furthers those interests because only one petition reaches the federal court; as a
result, the federal court "will be more likely to review all of the prisoner's claims
in a single proceeding, thus providing for a more focused and thorough review."
Rose, 455 U.S. at 520; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing
relationship between exhaustion doctrine and prisoners' interests).
63. 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 7 (quoting Harless v. Anderson, 664 F.2d 610, 612 (6th Cir.
1982)).
66. Id. at 8.
67. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982) (describing how federal courts
should exercise their discretion in determining whether to dismiss a petition for
failure to exhaust state remedies) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251
(1886)).
68. 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987) (unanimous) ("[Tihe history of the exhaustion
doctrine, as recently reviewed in [Rose], points in the direction of a middle
course.") (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 131. In Granberry, the state failed to raise the exhaustion de-
fense before the federal district court. Id. at 130. The prisoner appealed the
district court's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the
merits; only then did the state argue that the court should dismiss the petition
for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the Sev-
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instructed federal courts to balance the various interests in-
volved on a case-by-case basis to determine whether allowing
the state to waive the exhaustion requirement would further the
interest in comity.70
The Court revealed a similar commitment to flexibility in
Frisbie v. Collins.71 In Frisbie, a unanimous Supreme Court ex-
pressly authorized federal district courts to "deviate" from the
exhaustion doctrine in situations requiring "prompt federal in-
tervention."72 Although Rose did not allow the federal courts to
exercise discretion to serve the interests of the state prisoner,
the decisions in Granberry and Frisbie unequivocally demon-
strate the Court's historical and continuing commitment to dis-
cretion in habeas corpus jurisprudence.
2. The Federal Courts' Approaches when Discretionary
Review in the State Supreme Court Remains
Available
The federal courts disagree over whether a state prisoner
has sufficiently exhausted state remedies when discretionary re-
enth Circuit's order dismissing the petition on exhaustion grounds and re-
manded the case, instructing the court of appeals to weigh the various interests
involved to determine whether to address the prisoner's claims. Id. at 131, 134-
36; see also supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text (discussing foundational
principles of exhaustion doctrine).
Unlike in Rose, where the Court strictly enforced the exhaustion require-
ment, in Granberry the state failed to raise the exhaustion defense in federal
district court. In both cases, the prisoner had not technically exhausted state
remedies, yet the Court allowed considerable discretion to hear claims when the
state did not object, but refused such discretion when the state objected. This
distinction fails to account for the federal and judicial interests at stake in the
exhaustion doctrine because it makes federal judicial review dependent on the
actions of the state's lawyer.
70. Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131, 134. The Court considered three possible
methods of determining "[blow an appellate court ought to handle a
nonexhausted habeas petition when the State has not raised this objection in
the district court." Id. at 134. One extreme position the Court considered was
treating the state's failure to raise the issue as a procedural bar against the
state from raising the issue on appeal. Id. The other extreme was treating
"nonexhaustion as an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition
by the federal court" and dismissing the petition. Id. The third method, which
the Court adopted, was exercising discretion on a case-by-case basis to deter-
mine whether dismissal or hearing the prisoner's claims, despite nonexhaus-
tion, better serves justice. Id. at 131, 133.
71. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
72. Id. at 521-22. Although the Court regarded the facts in Frisbie as a
unique example of a situation requiring a prompt federal hearing, it left to the
federal courts' discretion the determination of whether future situations re-
quire prompt intervention. Id. at 521-22.
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view by the state's highest court remains available.73 The
Supreme Court has encountered this issue,74 but has never re-
solved it. 75 As a result, federal courts have adopted a variety of
approaches to this issue, making the availability of federal court
review for state prisoners dependent upon jurisdictional lines.
a. The Rigid Approach: Requiring Absolute Exhaustion
Some federal courts have interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and
Supreme Court decisions such as Rose v. Lundy to require dis-
missal of a state prisoner's habeas petition when the prisoner
has not pursued all remedies that the state offers. 76 Under this
73. Compare Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 124, 126-27 (6th Cir. 1993) (re-
quiring petition for discretionary review for exhaustion purposes despite state
supreme court dicta and unpublished Sixth Circuit precedent to the contrary);
Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(stating that prisoners must exhaust discretionary review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(finding state remedies unexhausted because prisoner failed to petition state
supreme court for discretionary review); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429,
431-32 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding claims unexhausted so long as truly discretion-
ary appellate review exists) and Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862-64 (9th
Cir. 1982) (requiring affirmative or "passive" exhaustion of discretionary review
under § 2254), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983) with Hull v. Freeman, 932
F.2d 159, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that untimely petitions to state
supreme court were sufficient to satisfy exhaustion doctrine); Elmore v. Foltz,
768 F.2d 773, 775 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding petitioner's claims exhausted despite
failure to petition state supreme court because prisoner wrote letter to the state
supreme court requesting review) and United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky,
689 F.2d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that untimely petitions to state
supreme court were sufficient to satisfy exhaustion doctrine) and with Dolny v.
Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that filing for discretion-
ary review unnecessary for exhaustion purposes), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902
(1995); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating prisoner
not required to petition state supreme court for certiorari for exhaustion pur-
poses); Smith v. White, 719 F.2d 390, 391-92 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that peti-
tion for discretionary review to certain state supreme courts not required to
satisfy exhaustion requirement) and Williams v. Wainwright, 452 F.2d 775,
776-77 (5th Cir. 1971) (regarding Florida prisoner's claims exhausted despite
failure to petition state supreme court for discretionary review).
74. See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 257 (1989) (describing prisoner's
procedural path that did not include petition to the state supreme court). In
Harris, the Court considered the state remedies exhausted because "petitioner
did raise his... claim in state court," even though the prisoner did not raise the
claim in the state supreme court and was not procedurally barred from doing
so. Id. at 263 n.9.
75. Cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 523-24 & n.1 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting precedential support for exhaustion doc-
trine not requiring states to provide every opportunity to review prisoners'
claims).
76. Silverburg, 993 F.2d at 126-27 (requiring petition to state supreme
court for discretionary review despite state court's dicta that state court of ap-
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approach, state prisoners who have not pursued all state reme-
dies must either return to state court to exhaust all of their
claims or proceed in federal court with only their exhausted
claims by deleting the unexhausted claims from their peti-
tions. 77 By deleting unexhausted claims, prisoners forfeit future
federal review of those claims. 78
The Fifth Circuit took this approach in Richardson v.
Procunier.7 9 In Richardson, the court held that the petitioner
failed to exhaust state remedies because he did not petition for
discretionary review in the state's highest court,80 yet the court
expressly refused to consider whether such a petition would
have been a futile act.81 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit recently
peals' decisions were final for exhaustion purposes); Jennison, 940 F.2d at 1310-
11 (stating that because discretionary state review is available, it must be ex-
hausted); Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) ("[Wihen a petitioner has not previously presented his claims to the
state's highest court, a procedure is 'available' for purposes of the exhaustion
requirement even if it is discretionary and contingent.") (citing Batchelor, 693
F.2d at 863), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991); Richardson, 762 F.2d at 430
(requiring petition to state's highest court despite fact that review was only dis-
cretionary and not a matter of right); Williams v. Duckworth, 724 F.2d 1439,
1441 (7th Cir.) ("Claims that can still be presented to the [state supreme court]
are not exhausted."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984).
77. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21. In this regard, Justice O'Connor did not com-
mand a majority in Rose v. Lundy, yet the practical effect has resulted in state
prisoners abandoning unexhausted claims to pursue exhausted claims. See
Turitz & van Loben Sels, supra note 3, at 1315 n.2753 (listing cases where state
prisoners waived unexhausted claims).
78. Prisoners would forfeit their chance to have federal review of their de-
leted claims because courts consider the filing of subsequent petitions contain-
ing the same claims to be an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Rose, 455 U.S.
at 521 (stating that abuse of the writ consists of deliberately abandoning a
ground for relief in an original petition, then raising that ground for relief in a
subsequent petition) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963));
see Turitz & van Loben Sels, supra note 3, at 1315 & n.2753. But see id. at 1316
& n.2754 (noting that some federal courts provide prisoner a continuance to
exhaust claims). Although the Rose plurality's view arguably offends the foun-
dational principles of the exhaustion doctrine, this issue is beyond the scope of
this Note. For an analysis of this issue, see Yackle, supra note 1, at 425-27(characterizing plurality's decision as unsupportable in light of principles un-
derlying the exhaustion doctrine).
79. 762 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 431-32. But see Williams v. Wainwright, 452 F.2d 775, 777 (5th
Cir. 1971) (holding that Florida prisoner not required to petition for discretion-
ary review in state supreme court when state court was very likely to deny
review because of the limited jurisdiction of the state court).
81. 762 F.2d at 432. The Fifth Circuit declined to decide whether a petition
for discretionary review under Texas law would be "futile" because "such a de-
termination... would often be no more than an attempt at reading the subjec-
tive mind of [the state's court]." Id.
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held that a state prisoner failed to exhaust state remedies be-
cause he never petitioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for dis-
cretionary review, despite the state court's declaration that
filing for discretionary review was unnecessary to exhaust state
remedies.8 2 The Ninth Circuit also followed this rigid
approach.83
In requiring absolute exhaustion, these circuits typically
point to the importance of the state's role in adjudicating and
interpreting federal law.8 4 By requiring a prisoner to apply for
discretionary review from the state supreme court, these circuits
attempt to ensure that states have the opportunity to partici-
pate in the development of federal and constitutional law.8s
These circuits also favor the federal courts' interest in judicial
efficiency.8 6 By returning petitions to the state courts, the fed-
eral courts force the states to expend additional resources and
effort to hear or deny the prisoners' claims.8 7 These state court
expenditures reduce the federal courts' duties because the addi-
tional procedural steps either deplete prisoners' resources or
narrow their claims, making the federal courts' decisions rela-
tively easy.88
By forcing prisoners to return to state courts, federal courts
also put the prisoners' claims at risk of dismissal under the "pro-
82. Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 126, 126-27. In Silverburg, the prisoner
relied on Freeman v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1985), and an un-
published opinion of the Sixth Circuit, Taylor v. Montgomery, 915 F.2d 1573
(6th Cir. 1990) (tbl.), both of which held that a decision by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals denying post-conviction relief constituted exhaustion of state reme-
dies without appealing to the state supreme court. 993 F.2d at 126-27. But cf
Elnore v. Foltz, 768 F.2d 773, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that writing let-
ter to state supreme court satisfies exhaustion requirement despite available
procedure to fie motion for new trial).
83. Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (stating that state supreme court cannot shirk constitutional duties by
declaring state remedies exhausted by state appellate court's decision); see also
Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting state supreme
court's duties to interpret federal law), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983).
84. See Jennison, 940 F.2d at 1311 (noting state courts' responsibility to
enforce Constitution) (quoting Batchelor, 693 F.2d at 862); Richardson, 762
F.2d at 430-31 (supporting the state courts' role in developing constitutional
law) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)); see also Exparte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (noting that state courts are "equally bound" to enforce
and protect the Constitution).
85. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion doc-
trine's underlying purposes of comity).
86. Jennison, 940 F.2d at 1311 (citing Batchelor, 693 F.2d at 862); Richard-
son, 762 F.2d at 432.
87. LIBMAN & HERTz, supra note 13, at 298-300.
88. Id. at 299-300.
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cedural default" or "independent and adequate state ground"
doctrine.8 9 According to this doctrine, if a state court denies a
prisoner's habeas petition because the prisoner failed to meet
the state's procedural requirements for seeking relief, the fed-
eral court cannot provide relief.90 For example, a prisoner could
petition a federal court for habeas relief, which the court could
refuse because the prisoner never petitioned the state supreme
court. Then, while the prisoner prepares to petition the state
supreme court, the state's statute of limitations could expire,
leading the state supreme court ultimately to reject the pris-
oner's petition as untimely. If this prisoner then attempts again
to seek federal relief, the federal court must deny it because of
this procedural default, regardless of the prisoner's unconstitu-
tional confinement.91
89. If a state prisoner fails to file a timely petition it may result in a proce-
dural default judgment against the prisoner. Under the procedural default doc-
trine of habeas corpus law,
[i]f the petitioner fails to present [the petition] to the state court in the
manner prescribed by the state courts procedural rules, the state court
may decline to address the claim on the basis of that procedural de-
fault. Furthermore, as long as the procedural default rests upon "ade-
quate and independent state grounds," the petitioner is generally
barred from obtaining federal habeas review of the defaulted claim.
Federal habeas courts will presume that no adequate and independent
state ground exists only when the state court's decision "fairly appears
to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law"
and when "the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion."
Turitz & van Loben Sels, supra note 3, at 1316-17 (footnotes omitted); see also
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991) ("The doctrine applies.., to
bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal
claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural require-
ment."); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-91 (1977) (requiring federal
courts to follow state contemporaneous objection rules in habeas proceedings);
Lay, supra note 32, at 131-40 (discussing harsh consequences of procedural de-
fault standard). But see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989) (avoiding
harsh procedural default standard to habeas petitioner's claims because peti-
tioner had raised claims in state court, but not state supreme court).
By returning the prisoner to the state supreme court, therefore, the federal
court jeopardizes the ability of the prisoner to bring the claim in federal court if
the prisoner is unable to file a timely petition in state court. If the federal court
did not require the prisoner to petition the state supreme court, the prisoner
could satisfy both the exhaustion doctrine and the procedural default doctrine
by raising the claim in the state appellate court.
90. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30.
91. Id. For example, in Silverburg v. Evitts, the Sixth Circuit declared the
state's remedies unexhausted because the prisoner had not requested discre-
tionary review with the state supreme court. 993 F.2d 124, 127 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Sixth Circuit stated, "Ordinarily we would dismiss without prejudice so
that petitioner could pursue his state court remedies. Here, however, peti-
tioner's claims are procedurally barred under Kentucky law .... " Id. (citation
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b. The Cosmetic Approach: Requiring the Appearance of
Exhaustion
Other circuits refrain from strictly enforcing the exhaustion
requirement whenever the state supreme court had some oppor-
tunity to review the prisoner's claims, even if that opportunity
was procedurally defective. Most notably, the Third Circuit de-
termined that a state prisoner exhausted available state reme-
dies by filing an untimely petition for state supreme court
review. 92 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that although a state
prisoner failed to seek discretionary review, he exhausted all
available state remedies by writing a letter to the state supreme
court, thus notifying the court of his claim.
93
Thus, instead of exercising discretion to allow state prison-
ers to bypass the discretionary review of the state supreme court
in limited circumstances, these circuits declare petitions ex-
hausted when the state supreme courts had an opportunity to
review prisoners' claims, even if the opportunity was hollow.
Moreover, by forcing prisoners to return to the state court pro-
cess, these circuits, like those adopting the rigid approach, put
the prisoners' claims at risk of the procedural default doctrine.
94
c. The Passive Approach: Declaring Petitions for
Discretionary Review Unnecessary
A third approach of the federal courts declares the state
prisoner's claim exhausted after the state's post-conviction ap-
pellate court denies the prisoner relief. The Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuits champion this approach,95 characterizing the
omitted). As a result, the court dismissed the prisoner's claims for failing to
exhaust state remedies while acknowledging that exhaustion was impossible.
Id. In effect, the Sixth Circuit decided that the prisoner's claims would never
receive federal review.
92. Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (accepting an un-
timely motion on direct appeal as sufficient for exhaustion) (citing Bond v.
Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1989)); United States ex rel. Caruso v.
Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
93. Elmore v. Foltz, 768 F.2d 773, 774-75 (6th Cir. 1985). The petitioner's
letter complied with the state's procedural mechanisms allowing indigent in-
mates to seek review. Id. at 775.
94. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing hazards asso-
ciated with procedural default doctrine).
95. See Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 902 (1995); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1984);
Smith v. White, 719 F.2d 390, 392 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Wil-
liams v. Wainwright, 452 F.2d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that limited
discretionary review procedure in Florida's supreme court offered "no practical
remedy that [the prisoner] was required to exhaust").
1214
1995] HABEAS CORPUS 1215
possibility that the state supreme court will actually grant re-
view of a prisoner's claims as remote.96 These circuits reason
that the interests of comity and judicial efficiency prevent fed-
eral courts from dismissing the prisoners' claims, because dis-
missing the claims would result in additional work for state
courts and repetitive work for the federal courts if the prisoner
returns to the federal system after exhausting state remedies. 97
These circuits interpret 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), which states
that the prisoner must exhaust all remedies available "if he has
the right under the law of the State to raise ... the question
presented,"98 to mean that the prisoner must exhaust state pro-
cedures available only as a matter of right.99 If a state court
96. Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384 (stating that prisoner's right of review in the
state supreme court was "unquestionably restricted" because the state court
grants less than 25% of all petitions for review, including non-habeas petitions);
Buck, 743 F.2d at 1569 (stating that prisoner not required to petition for certio-
rari because state's supreme court had limited jurisdiction) (quoting Williams,
452 F.2d at 777); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Thus, in determining whether a remedy for a particular constitu-
tional claim is 'available,' the federal courts are authorized, indeed required, to
assess the likelihood that a state court will accord the habeas petitioner a hear-
ing on the merits of his claim.").
97. Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384; Buck, 743 F.2d at 1569 (quoting Williams, 452
F.2d at 777). The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, however, construe judicial effi-
ciency in light of the state court's interests in not being burdened with petitions
for relief when the courts are not designed to address them. Dolny, 32 F.3d at
384 (quoting Buck, 743 F.2d at 1569 (quoting Williams, 452 F.2d at 777)).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1988).
99. See Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384 (reasoning that "'[t]he right.., to raise' an
issue referred to in § 2254 means more than a mere opportunity to seek leave to
present an issue" (omission in original)); see also LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note
13, at 310 n.22 ("[Tihe federal definition [of exhaustion] apparently 'Pegs' ex-
haustion to completion of those appellate procedures that, under state law, are
'as of right' and not merely discretionary."). In formulating its rule that prison-
ers need not petition state supreme courts for discretionary review to exhaust
state remedies, the Eighth Circuit reasoned by analogy to Fay v. Noia, which
held that state prisoners were not required to petition the U.S. Supreme Court
for discretionary review on direct appeal before filing for habeas corpus relief.
See, e.g., Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384 (citing Fay, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963), overruled
on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and Cole-
man v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977)). In Fay, the Court noted that direct review in the Supreme Court "'is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion'" and held, therefore, that
petition for review in Supreme Court was not required before filing for habeas
corpus review. 372 U.S. at 436 (quoting Sup. CT. R. 19(1)). The Court justified
its holding in Fay by stating:
[Tihe requirement [that prisoners must petition the Supreme Court for
discretionary review of a state supreme court ruling before filing for
habeas corpus] has proved only to be an unnecessarily burdensome
step in the orderly processing of the federal claims of those convicted of
state crimes. The goal of prompt and fair criminal justice has been
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would review the petitioner's claims on a discretionary basis and
need not reach the merits of the claim, it is not an appeal as of
right, and the exhaustion doctrine accordingly does not require
the prisoner to exhaust discretionary review before filing a fed-
eral habeas corpus petition.10 0 By not forcing the prisoner to
return to state court, these circuits do not subject the prisoner's
claims to risks associated with the procedural default
doctrine.' 0
II. FAVORING EASE OF APPLICATION OF THE
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE OVER PROMOTING
THE PURPOSES OF THE EXHAUSTION
DOCTRINE
Each of the three above approaches to the exhaustion doc-
trine is subject to attack for failing to accommodate notions of
comity and judicial efficiency, the underlying purposes of the ex-
haustion doctrine.' 0 2 This failure stems from confusion over the
Supreme Court's mixed messages in Rose v. Lundy and
Granberry v. Greer.'0 3 Despite affirming the historical commit-
ment to maintaining flexibility in those cases, the Supreme
Court also demonstrated its willingness to turn its back on the
exhaustion doctrine's flexible nature and to develop rigid ap-
proaches to resolve exhaustion problems.' 0 4 Rose v. Lundy, for
impeded because in the overwhelming number of cases the applica-
tions [fail to meet the factors determining whether the Court will grant
discretionary review]. And the demands upon our time in the exami-
nation and decision of the large volume of petitions which fail to meet
that test have unwarrantably taxed the resources of this Court. In-
deed, it has happened that counsel on oral argument has confessed
that the record was insufficient to justify our consideration... but that
he had felt compelled to make the futile time-consuming application in
order to qualify for proceeding in a Federal District Court on habeas
corpus to make a proper record.
372 U.S. at 437 (citing Bullock v. South Carolina, 365 U.S. 292 (1961) (per
curiam)), overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), overruled on other
grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
100. LiEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 13, at 310 n.22.
101. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing risks associ-
ated with the procedural default doctrine).
102. See supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion
doctrine's underlying purposes of comity and judicial efficiency).
103. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text (discussing the seem-
ingly different approaches to the exhaustion doctrine that the Supreme Court
follows).
104. See Herman, supra note 53, at 270 (noting Supreme Court's narrowing
of federal habeas statute); Lay, supra note 32, at 1018 (criticizing Supreme
Court's "procedural hurdles" making writs less accessible); Frank J. Remington,
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example, implicitly called for federal courts to abandon the pre-
vious notions of flexibility and efficiency associated with the ex-
haustion doctrine.10 5 Unable to decipher the Supreme Court's
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal courts have
turned to unproductive rigidity, insincere procedural cosmetics,
and unnecessary acquiescence when considering the exhaustion
doctrine. These misguided approaches fail to meet the exhaus-
tion doctrine's underlying purposes of comity between federal
and state courts and judicial efficiency.
A. THE RIGID APPROACH: EXHAUST REMEDIES REGARDLEss OF
CoMIrry AND EFFICIENCY
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits champion a rigid approach to
the exhaustion doctrine when a state prisoner who seeks federal
habeas relief has not petitioned the state supreme court for dis-
cretionary review.10 6 These circuits rely on an analysis similar
to the Supreme Court's analysis in Rose v. Lundy.107 Nonethe-
State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal
Courts; An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OmIo ST. L.J. 287,
287 (1983) ("It is more difficult today than it was a decade ago for a state pris-
oner to persuade a federal court to review the propriety of his state court convic-
tion or sentence."); Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal
Change, 44 Ouxo ST. L.J. 337, 355 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court's decisions
limiting availability of habeas relief); J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal
Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism; the Burden for Defense Counsel; and
the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. Rav. 291, 327 (1992) (noting that Supreme.
Court streamlined federal habeas corpus "at the expense of access to federal
district courts for state inmates"); Yackle, supra note 1, at 394 (noting erosion of
federal judicial discretion as Court imposes more rigid rules).
105. See Lay, supra note 32, at 1029-30 (noting that dismissal is mandatory
and arguing that procedures required to determine exhaustion are inefficient);
see also Yackle, supra note 1, at 424 (noting inefficiencies associated with re-
turning petition to state court for failing to exhaust state remedies).
106. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text (discussing rigid ap-
proach to the exhaustion doctrine based on interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
that requires a petition for discretionary review if prisoner has right to petition
the state court, regardless of whether actual review is as a matter of right).
107. See, e.g., Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), as guiding precedent). Following
Rose, the Fifth Circuit in Richardson strictly enforced the exhaustion require-
ment against a prisoner who had failed to petition his state's supreme court for
discretionary review under the guise that rigorous enforcement of the exhaus-
tion requirement would benefit the states. Id.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Batchelor v. Cupp held that the prisoner
must return to state court to petition the state supreme court for discretionary
review, despite the fact that the state urged the court to consider the claims
exhausted after reaching the state appellate court level. 693 F.2d 859, 861-62
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983). Batchelor, therefore, is
analogous to Granberry v. Greer, in which the state did not object to the pris-
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less, this approach fails to promote the exhaustion doctrine's un-
derlying purposes.' 08
By rigidly enforcing the exhaustion requirement in cases
where state prisoners have not filed for discretionary review
with the state's highest court, the federal courts actually under-
mine the exhaustion doctrine's foundational notions of com-
ity.'0 9 The state courts have ample opportunity to control and
dictate their criminal justice systems through a full round of di-
rect appeals and at least one collateral appeal at the state appel-
late court level before the prisoner applies for federal habeas
review. 10 Furthermore, state supreme courts typically prefer
not to hear a prisoner's habeas petition based on federal law be-
cause they feel overburdened with habeas petitions.-" In con-
trast, federal courts have a greater interest in habeas cases,
because federal courts determine the ultimate outcomes of is-
sues concerning federal statutory and constitutional law. 12 Ac-
oner's claims on the basis of exhaustion. See Granberry, 481 U.S. 129, 130-31
(1987); supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing Granberry). Un-
like Granberry, in which the Court directed lower federal courts to exercise dis-
cretion when the state fails to raise the exhaustion defense, 481 U.S. at 134-36,
the Ninth Circuit still favored strictly enforcing the exhaustion doctrine in
Batchelor, 693 F.2d at 861-62.
108. Yackle, supra note 1, at 394 ("[A] set of rigid rules ... fails to serve the
doctrine's rationales and, indeed, threatens to create greater friction between
the federal and state courts."); id. at 400-01 ("[Ihe introduction of rigid rules
... promises to frustrate the very interests the doctrine was designed to
protect.").
109. Blocker, supra note 48, at 508 ("Strict mechanical adherence to the ex-
haustion requirement does not always protect state interests and is, in fact,
often more destructive than solicitous of the doctrine of comity."); see also
Yackle, supra note 1, at 400-01 (arguing that federal courts must have "sound
reasons" for requiring prompt federal review).
110. Such an active state role adequately serves the interests of federalism,
making the rigid enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine unnecessary. See
Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. Rv.
1038, 1095 (1970) ("Generally, the interests which underlie the [exhaustion]
rule are compelling only with respect to appellate, not collateral, processes. It
is the appellate process which most directly provides the higher state courts an
opportunity to supervise trial courts and facilitate uniform application of the
law.").
111. See Lay, supra note 32, at 1028-29 (discussing states' efforts to reduce
habeas petitions); cf Yackle, supra note 27, at 1010 (noting that state courts
resent federal courts that "undertake] to second-guess judgments ... affirmed
by the states' highest courts").
112. See Evan T. Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 151, 172 (1994) ("tOne must find 'irresistible' the ... proposition that
every state criminal defendant has a right to litigate federal claims in a federal
forum."); see also Yackle, supra note 27, at 1022 ("[T]here is a national interest
in the correct and uniform interpretation of federal law.").
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cordingly, when a federal court returns a prisoner's habeas
petition to state court, the federal court adds to the state court's
docket only to satisfy a mere perfimctory procedural require-
ment that inevitably results in the prisoner's return to federal
court.1 13 Moreover, the cases the federal court adds to the state
docket are those that the state court has least interest in
hearing.114
In addition, state supreme courts consider the federal
courts' strict enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine patroniz-
ing.115 When a single federal district court judge substantively
113. See Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that
dismissing claims for failure to petition state supreme courts for discretionary
review produces "fruitless and burdensome petitions" for state courts), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that rigidly enforcing the
exhaustion rule "tends to increase, rather than to alleviate, the caseload bur-
dens on both state and federal courts"); Levit, supra note 21, at 593 n.171
("State court resources are obviously conserved when a petitioner does not have
to return to state court to relitigate.").
114. See, e.g., Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting
the Kentucky Supreme Court's hostility to petitions filed for discretionary re-
view merely to meet exhaustion requirements for federal courts); Jennison v.
Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting Arizona
Supreme Court's preference to avoid hearing state habeas cases) (citing Arizona
v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc)); Yackle, supra note 1, at
423 ("A doctrine that puts the state courts to meaningless litigation can claim
precious little basis in the notion of comity. Orderly state procedures are not so
much disrupted as abused, the state courts' participation in the enforcement of
federal law not so much frustrated as coerced."); see also Lee, supra note 112, at
158 (arguing that state courts' knowledge that federal courts determine the ul-
timate outcome in habeas petitions undermines the state courts' sense of
responsibility).
115. One of the reasons cited for the strict enforcement of the exhaustion
requirement is encouraging state courts to become comfortable with and knowl-
edgeable about federal law. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting
that familiarizing state courts with federal constitutional and statutory law is
an underlying purpose of exhaustion doctrine). Yet federal courts "can hardly
say in one breath that the state courts are fully capable of adjudicating federal
claims and in the next that they are so inexperienced that federal treatment of
issues.., must be delayed while they sharpen their skills." Yackle, supra note
1, at 428.
Another reason advanced for rigidly enforcing the exhaustion doctrine is
that the diligent efforts of state courts can increase the efficiency of federal
courts by developing a full record and refining legal issues. See supra notes 43-
48 and accompanying text (discussing judicial efficiency as an underlying pur-
pose of exhaustion doctrine); Hirsh, supra note 22, at 428 (arguing that state
courts can correct errors of state and federal law). Professor Yackle notes the
patronizing quality of this justification for the rigid enforcement of the exhaus-
tion doctrine:
Federal review is not deferred to allow the state courts to assist the
federal courts in the exercise of their independent habeas jurisdic-
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overrules a state court decision, the federal judge's decision may
humiliate the state judges who labored to reach the state court's
decision.116 Accordingly, when a federal court automatically re-
fuses to hear a state prisoner's habeas petition until the prisoner
presents it to the state supreme court for discretionary review,
the state court has very little incentive to hear the case.
Finally, rigidly dismissing state prisoners' habeas corpus
petitions because the prisoners did not petition the state
supreme courts for discretionary review fails to further the ex-
haustion doctrine's purpose of enhancing judicial efficiency. De-
spite the resources that state courts expend to handle returned
petitions, the prisoner returns to federal court, where the fed-
eral court must again determine whether the prisoner ex-
hausted state remedies. Both state and federal courts desire
judicial efficiency,11 7 but by forcing the prisoner back into the
state court process, federal courts increase the workload of the
state courts. 118 Because the exhaustion requirement is only an
issue of timing,11 9 the state courts know habeas petitions even-
tually reach the federal courts. 120 By returning the petition to
state court, the federal court only increases the time required to
tion. ... State courts might take offense if the Justices should instruct
the lower federal courts to stay their hand regarding federal claims,
because they stand to benefit from preliminary state review-as
though the state courts were stalking horses to be used by federaljudges anxious to conserve their own efforts in habeas cases.
Yackle, supra note 1, at 430.
116. Remington, supra note 104, at 292 (noting that historically state court
judges feel annoyed when a single federal judge overturns their decisions); see
also Larry W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposal,
68 IowA L. REv. 609, 609 (1983) (identifying the disruptive effect collateral re-
view has on state courts).
117. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 (noting judicial interests in efficiency under-
lying exhaustion doctrine); Schnell, supra note 47, at 367 ("Concern for the
amount of judicial resources consumed by review of habeas corpus petitions
continues to be strong." (citation omitted)).
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing increased bur-
den on state courts resulting from dismissing habeas petition for failure to ex-
haust discretionary state remedies).
119. See supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying text (noting that exhaustion
of state remedies does not affect jurisdiction, but rather timing of federal
review).
120. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting "judicial ping-pong" that results from requiring habeas petitioners
to return to state court); Rose, 455 U.S. at 527-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that petitions dismissed for failure to exhaust state rem-
edies eventually return to federal court).
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resolve the prisoner's habeas petition, and this delay detrimen-
tally affects the state's interest in finality of judgment.' 12
Forcing the prisoner to return to state court also detrimen-
tally affects the prisoner's interest in obtaining relief from un-
constitutional confinement as soon as possible. 122 State
prisoners often endure years of litigation in federal and state
courts before the courts decide the merits of their habeas
claims. 123 For example, after failing to have his conviction over-
turned in state courts, the petitioner in Buck v. Green'24 en-
dured ten additional years of imprisonment until the Eleventh
Circuit finally vacated the judgment.125 Had the Eleventh Cir-
cuit returned the petitioner's claim for failing to petition the
state supreme court for discretionary review, the petitioner's un-
constitutional confinement would have lasted even longer.' 26
Forcing the prisoner back into the state court process also
detrimentally affects the federal courts' interests in efficiency. 12 7
By rigidly enforcing the exhaustion doctrine without leaving
room for appropriate discretion, federal courts dramatically in-
crease their own workload.128 Statistically, habeas petitions are
121. By requiring prisoners to return to state courts to exhaust their claims
and then petition the federal court again, the habeas process involves unneces-
sary duplication. Lee, supra note 112, at 158. Such duplication squanders eco-
nomic and judicial resources. Id.
122. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing prisoners' inter-
ests at stake in exhaustion doctrine).
123. Yackle, supra note 116, at 636 n.120.
124. 743 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1984).
125. See Buck v. Green, 874 F.2d 1578, 1581 (11th Cir. 1989) (vacating judg-
ment against prisoner). The prisoner had first contested his conviction collater-
ally in state court in 1979. Buck v. State, 259 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979) (rejecting collateral attack).
126. Buck, 743 F.2d at 1569 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding state remedies ex-
hausted despite petitioner's failure to petition state supreme court for discre-
tionary review).
127. Blindly forcing the prisoner to return to state court is not efficient for
state courts or federal courts:
State court resources are obviously conserved when a petitioner does
not have to return to state court to relitigate. Additionally, federal
court resources are conserved in those instances in which the peti-
tioner eventually would have returned to federal court. If the peti-
tioner's claim is without merit, additional litigation should be avoided;
if the petitioner has a valid claim, it is unsound to refuse to render a
decision on the merits and require a return to state court without a
compelling justification while the petitioner remains unconstitution-
ally confined.
Levit, supra note 21, at 593 n.171.
128. Determining whether a prisoner exhausted available state remedies
consumes scarce federal judicial resources. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 8
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Few issues consume as much of the scarce time
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extremely fast, cheap decisions for an individual court. 129 Re-
quiring federal courts to return petitioners to state court merely
to fulfill an often needless procedural step increases the federal
courts' workload and costs, because the prisoner almost always
returns to federal court.' 30
B. THE CosMETic APPROACH: APPEAR EXHAUSTED DESPITE
HARMS TO ComiTY AND EFFICIENCY
The cosmetic approach of the Third and Sixth Circuits also
fails to further the interests of the exhaustion doctrine. 1' 1 This
approach considers prisoners' claims exhausted when the pris-
oners filed untimely or ineffective petitions for review with the
state supreme courts. 13 2 In effect, when the opportunity for a
timely petition has lapsed, this approach requires prisoners to
file untimely state court petitions to fulfill the exhaustion re-
quirement. Such untimely petitions, however, subject the
claims to the "cause and prejudice" test of the procedural default
doctrine. 13 Thus, although the cosmetic approach may promote
procedural purity, it also leaves open the possibility that the
state court will deny the prisoner's untimely or impractical peti-
tion on adequate and independent state grounds, thus barring
the federal court from ever hearing the prisoner's claims.'3
4
of federal judges as the question whether a state prisoner adequately exhausted
his state remedies."). Yet, requiring the prisoner to return to state court merely
to have the state supreme court reject a petition for discretionary review in
order for the federal claim to be "technically exhausted" results in the loss of
more federal judicial resources. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 527 (1982) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If the district court must... dismiss the
... petition until all grounds for relief have been exhausted, the prisoner will
likely return to federal court eventually, thereby necessitating duplicative ex-
amination of the record.").
129. See Hirsch, supra note 22, at 428 n.64 (citing evidence that courts dis-
miss virtually all federal habeas petitions prior to trial and that state prisoners
account for small fraction of the total filings in federal district courts).
Although state prisoners may account for a dramatic increase in litigation in
federal courts, "the increase has been attributable largely to [civil rights viola-
tions] litigation rather than to section 2254 challenges to state court convic-
tions." Remington, supra note 104, at 292.
130. See Anderson, 459 U.S. at 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (outlining cosmetic
approach).
132. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing cosmetic
approach).
133. See supra notes 89-91, 94 and accompanying text (discussing risks as-
sociated with procedural default doctrine).
134. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing risk to state pris-




Although it allows more flexibility and discretion than the rigid
approach, the cosmetic approach unnecessarily complicates the
decision-making process with legal fiction, allowing circuit
courts to shirk responsibility for their discretion.
Furthermore, the legal fiction that an untimely petition to a
state's highest court exhausts the remedy available in that
court 135 serves no practical function and fulfills no purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine. 136 In fact, relying on this legal fiction
undermines the notions of comity, jeopardizes society's confi-
dence in the judicial system as a whole, and exacerbates judicial
inefficiency.
By allowing untimely petitions to satisfy the exhaustion re-
quirement, federal courts undermine notions of comity by send-
ing mixed messages to the state courts. They express a
willingness to enforce the exhaustion doctrine to protect a state's
interests, yet they do not require prisoners to exhaust state rem-
edies in a timely or effective fashion. As a result, the state
courts' rejections of prisoners' untimely and obscure petitions
serve only to rubber stamp the federal court's decision to hear
the prisoner's petition despite the actual failure to exhaust state
remedies. 137 This approach also undermines society's confi-
dence in the judicial system by diluting the incentive for state
prisoners to file timely and effective petitions for discretionary
relief.138 Finally, this approach exacerbates judicial inefficiency
because state courts must review ineffective and untimely peti-
135. See, e.g., Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe peti-
tioner's mere 'presentment of an untimely petition to the state's highest court
represented] substantial compliance with the... exhaustion requirement.'"
(quoting Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1989)).
136. In effect, this approach regards the state supreme court's refusal to
hear an untimely or ineffective petition as satisfaction of the state court's inter-
ests that the exhaustion doctrine supposedly protects. Id. at 164-65; cf. Elmore
v. Foltz, 768 F.2d 773, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a "letter request"
raising "obscure" issues to Michigan Supreme Court satisfied exhaustion
requirement).
137. In reality, the federal courts exercise their discretion to review prison-
ers' claims despite a lack of "technical" exhaustion. The federal courts, how-
ever, disguise their discretion through analytical acrobatics by declaring that
the prisoners in fact exhausted their claims by petitioning for discretionary re-
view that was no longer available. In other words, the state prisoner exhausts
"available" state remedies by petitioning for relief that is unavailable.
138. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991) (noting the risk
that prisoners could simply default on state remedies as a method of exhaus-




tions, and those petitions that survive the procedural default
doctrine ultimately return to federal court.13 9
Although this approach allows more room for flexibility
than the rigid approach, it is flexibility without reason. It sacri-
fices judicial sincerity and promotes confusion. The fact that
prisoners must file untimely petitions belittles the state courts'
timing requirements, solely to procedurally "purify" petitions for
federal court.
C. THE PASSIVE APPROACH: SACRIFICE COMITY FOR
EFFICIENCY
The approach recently favored by the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits completely disregards the prisoner's failure to petition
the state's supreme court for discretionary review before filing a
federal habeas corpus petition. 140 Although this approach ex-
emplifies those courts' willingness to exercise discretion to hear
technically unexhausted petitions, these circuits have failed to
provide the proper analytical framework necessary for guiding
the federal courts' discretion. 14
1
The Eighth Circuit in Dolny v. Erickson,142 for example, re-
lied too heavily on the limited availability of relief in the state's
supreme court. 143 After reviewing the Minnesota Supreme
Court's statistical record, the Eighth Circuit characterized the
Minnesota Supreme Court as unwilling to grant discretionary
review of habeas petitions, and then declared that petitioning
139. See supra notes 113, 118 and accompanying text (noting judicial ineffi-
ciencies in returning petitions to state courts only to have the state prisoner
return later to federal court).
140. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing passive
approach).
141. See, e.g., Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that prisoner did not need to petition for discretionary review when such a
petition was now precluded by state time limits), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902(1995).
142. 32 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995). The
Eighth Circuit explicitly followed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Buck
v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1984), rather than the rigid approach
of the Ninth Circuit in Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.
1991) (per curiam), or the Fifth Circuit in Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d
429, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1985). Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384.
143. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuits' view that limited availability of discretionary review in state
supreme courts supports hearing habeas claims in federal court). Availability
of relief in state courts is one factor federal courts should balance in determin-
ing exhaustion, see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring), but other interests are also important. See infra part ILA (discussing
state, federal, judicial, and prisoner interests).
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that state's supreme court is always unnecessary. 14 Because
the availability of review in state supreme courts may fluctu-
ate, 145 and because federal courts disagree about the state
courts' degree of availability,146 the Eighth Circuit's reliance on
the scarcity of discretionary review of habeas petitions by a state
court is unfounded. In addition, allowing prisoners to circum-
vent the state supreme court's discretionary review does not nec-
essarily improve judicial efficiency, because the state supreme
court could grant relief in some instances, thereby reducing the
federal courts' workload. 47
The Dolny court's decision also undermines notions of com-
ity because it fails to balance other interests at stake in deter-
mining whether a federal court should exercise its discretion to
review a technically unexhausted petition. Although the Dolny
court considered the state court's interest in hearing habeas pe-
titions generally, it failed to consider the state's interests in the
instant case.' 48 The Eighth Circuit provided state prisoners a
direct route to federal court that bypasses the state supreme
court.1 4 9 This direct route virtually obliterated any opportunity
for the state supreme court to influence its state's habeas pro-
cess or to increase protection of federal rights within the
state, 5 0 because it left state prisoners with little incentive to
144. Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384.
145. Changes in court rules, statutes, and even state constitutions often de-
termine the scope of a state court's discretion to review cases. See, e.g., Rich-
ardson, 762 F.2d at 431 n.1 (noting that a constitutional amendment in Florida
gave the Florida Supreme Court broader discretion); see also Dolny, 32 F.3d at
384 & n.5 (referencing Minnesota's rules of appellate procedure that establish
criteria to guide the Minnesota Supreme Court's exercise of discretionary
review).
146. Compare Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384 & n.5 (describing availability of discre-
tionary review based on rules of appellate procedure as "llimited") with Rich-
ardson, 762 F.2d at 431-32 (describing similar criteria as providing "broad
discretion").
147. But see Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384 (noting that Minnesota Supreme Court
grants review to less than 25% of all petitions for review, including non-habeas
petitions).
148. See id. (analyzing reasons why dismissing petition for failure to ex-
haust would burden state supreme court, but failing to discuss any interest
state court may have in ruling on the merits of prisoner's claims).
149. Id. ("[When a petitioner has presented his claims to the State's Court
of Appeals, [he] need not... [seek] discretionary review prior to requesting
federal habeas relief.").
150. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 267 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)




petition the state supreme court.151 In addition, a blanket rule
declaring petitions to state supreme courts unnecessary for ex-
haustion purposes leaves the state courts with statutory author-
ity to exercise discretion in granting review of habeas petitions
from state prisoners, but without any practical opportunity to
exercise that discretion. Furthermore, allowing prisoners to cir-
cumvent the state supreme court immediately reduces that
court's influence over the state's intermediate courts of
appeals. 152
II. RETURNING TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE'S
PURPOSES
Instead of adopting the approaches in Richardson v.
Procunier153 and Dolny v. Erickson,'54 which exacerbate judicial
inefficiencies and impede comity between federal and state
courts, the federal courts should adopt a guided case-by-case
balancing test when deciding whether state prisoners have ex-
hausted state remedies. Under this balancing test, federal
courts would exercise discretion by balancing the four interests
that the exhaustion doctrine's purposes implicate within guide-
lines for typical substantive situations in habeas petitions. This
balancing approach would successfully accommodate the ex-
haustion doctrine's purposes and expectations while retaining
fairness and flexibility in the habeas corpus system, much like
the Supreme Court's approach in Granberry v. Greer.155
151. Of course, prisoners believing the state supreme court is more likely to
provide relief than federal courts have an incentive to petition for discretionary
review. Conventional wisdom, however, is that federal courts are more recep-
tive to federal and constitutional issues and exercise more independent judg-
ment. See Yackle, supra note 27, at 1022-24 (distinguishing the interests of
federal and state judges); Yackle, supra note 116, at 616-17 (arguing that fed-
eraljudges are less concerned about guilt or innocence than state counterparts);
see also Blocker, supra note 48, at 507 ("[IUt should not be forgotten that the
state itself, in every habeas corpus proceeding, is first and foremost dedicated to
advancing its own interests."). In addition, prisoners on death row have an in-
centive to petition state courts for discretionary review in order to postpone exe-
cution. Id. at 508.
152. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting that state supreme
court could provide more protection under state law than provided under fed-
eral law).
153. 762 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1985).
154. 32 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995).
155. 481 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1987); see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's flexible approach in Granberry); see also Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521 (1952) (noting that exhaustion requirement is flexible




A. THE FLEXIBLE APPROACH: EXERCISING JUDICIAL
DISCRETION To ENHANCE COMITY AND INCREASE
EFFICIENCY
Instead of creating rigid, mechanical rules or relying on pro-
cedural cosmetics to justify decisions, the federal courts should
embrace the discretion inherent in the exhaustion doctrine
15 6
and use it, within guidelines discussed below, to further the pur-
poses of the exhaustion doctrine. Upon a motion by the state
prosecutor to dismiss a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus
petition,' 5 7 where the prisoner has not properly petitioned 58
the state supreme court for discretionary review, 159 a federal
court should presume that the state remedies are unexhausted.
This presumption would be overcome if the court's analysis of
the four interests derived from the underlying purposes of the
exhaustion doctrine suggested that another state review is un-
necessary. The four interests are the state court's interest in
hearing the claim, the judicial system's interest in efficiency, the
federal court's interest in hearing the claim, and the prisoner's
interest in speedy review.
Situational guidelines based on the substantive content of
the petition should determine the relative weight of each inter-
est. Most habeas petitions from state prisoners fall into one of
three situations. The first situation involves a petitioner ques-
tioning the constitutionality of the state's exercise of its author-
ity under color of state law. These cases typically involve
questioning the constitutional validity of the state's statutory
law' 60 or calling for federal review of a state judge's or law en-
156. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's commitment to interpreting the exhaustion doctrine as a flexible rule).
157. If the state fails to raise the issue of exhaustion or waives the exhaus-
tion defense, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to exercise dis-
cretion in determining whether to hear habeas petitions on a case-by-case basis.
See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131, 133; supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Granberry).
158. Failure to petition a state court properly includes failure to make
timely and appropriate filings that are necessary to obtain effective relief.
159. Because the prisoner's claims are not "technically" exhausted-and the
state objects on that ground-the federal court should initially favor dismissing
the petition, see Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131, unless the prisoner demonstrates
that the balance of interests involved weighs in favor of immediate federal re-
view. The fact that the state did not choose the federal forum also favors a
presumption of non-exhaustion.
160. Federal courts should be more inclined to dismiss a petition disputing
the constitutionality of a state law to provide the state court an opportunity to
interpret its own state's law. Because federal courts must adhere to state
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forcement officer's misconduct.161 The federal court in these
cases should dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies in order to respect the state court's interest in inter-
preting and enforcing state law, and to respect the state court's
authority over state judges and officers. 162 Because the federal
court does not lose jurisdiction to hear the claims, but only de-
lays considering them, the federal court should allow the state
court the opportunity to exercise its authority over state law.163
The second situation involves petitioners seeking federal re-
view of a purely federal constitutional or statutory law issue.' 64
In these cases, the federal court should normally favor hearing
supreme court interpretations of state statutes, the state court's interest is ex-
tremely great.
161. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5 (1982) (per curiam) (con-
cerning prisoner's claim challenging trial court's jury instruction distinguishing
second degree murder and manslaughter under state law); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 511 (1982) (concerning prisoner's request for habeas relief based on
improper jury instructions, improper denial of right to confrontation, and prose-
cutor's misconduct); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394 (1963) (concerning pris-
oner's allegations that state actors procured his confession through coercion),
overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992),
and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977); Thompson v. Missouri Bd. of Parole, 929 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.
1991) (concerning prisoner's challenge to state's statute regarding discharge
from parole); Satterwhite v. Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam) (concerning prisoner's challenge to state court's decision allowing trial
court bailiff to testify during trial); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1568 (11th
Cir. 1984) (concerning state prisoner's challenge regarding county's method of
jury selection).
162. State courts are likely to be most interested in federal law when it im-
plicates state officials and thus are likely to exercise their discretion to grant
review. But see Levit, supra note 21, at 595 (arguing that federal courts fail to
correct constitutional errors because they are unreasonably reluctant to over-
turn state court decisions concerning a state judge's conduct out of deference to
state courts).
The flexible, balancing approach accommodates situations involving clear
constitutional violations by allowing federal courts to weigh the prisoner's in-
terests as well as the interests of the state courts. If the constitutional violation
is particularly egregious or obvious, the federal court may determine that the
prisoner's interests in speedy relief outweigh the state's interests in supervising
its judges.
163. See supra notes 25, 28 and accompanying text (noting that the exhaus-
tion doctrine presents an issue of timing rather than jurisdiction).
164. See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 258 (1989) (concerning prisoner's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 2
(1981) (per curiam) (same); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 345-46
(1973) (concerning prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims); Dolny
v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (concerning prisoner's claims based
on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902
(1995); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1982) (concerning pris-
oner's double jeopardy claim), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056 (1983).
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the prisoner's claim unless the state shows prejudice or a partic-
ularly important state court interest in hearing the claim. Typi-
cally, the state's interest is minimal because the claim does not
involve state statutory law or judicial misconduct. The claim is
also likely to reach federal court eventually.165 Because the
prisoner's interest lies in speedy relief,166 the balance of inter-
ests weighs in favor of resolving the issue quickly in federal
court.
The third situation involves petitioners sentenced to
death.167 In capital punishment cases, the federal court should
favor dismissing the petition for failure to exhaust state reme-
dies. Because the death penalty is particularly controversial,
the state court has a heightened interest in maintaining a voice
in the development of habeas law in this area. The state
supreme court is also more likely to grant discretionary review
of capital cases than it is for other types of cases. 168 The federal
court's interests in preventing unconstitutional executions also
favor enforcing the exhaustion requirement strictly in death
penalty situations to ensure that courts leave no constitutional
stone unturned and no procedural irregularity unexamined. 6 9
Furthermore, prisoners facing the death penalty usually seek
review in all possible fora and are thus unlikely to forego peti-
tioning the state court for discretionary review.' 70
In general, federal courts using these three situational
guidelines could more easily balance the exhaustion doctrine's
165. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that prisoners'
claims, if unsuccessful in state court's discretionary review, eventually reach
federal court).
166. See supra notes 48, 122-126 and accompanying text (discussing typical
prisoner's interest in obtaining relief as soon as possible).
167. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1991) (concern-
ing prisoner's request for habeas relief after receiving death sentence).
168. Discretionary review is more likely because state courts recognize the
inherent seriousness of the punishment, have an interest in playing a role in
capital punishment law, and are probably divided on capital punishment
issues.
169. See Lay, supra note 32, at 1017 (discussing importance of ensuring
"studied examination" of death sentences for constitutional violations).
170. Death row prisoners typically pursue any available opportunity for re-
lief and thus would petition the state supreme court for discretionary review on
their own volition. They may, however, bypass the state supreme court in an
effort to persuade the federal court to dismiss their petition, sending them back
to state courts, prolonging the habeas process, and postponing execution. See,
e.g., Blocker, supra note 48, at 508 (discussing Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549
(5th Cir. 1982), in which the state prisoner requested the federal court to dis-




four underlying interests and thus further the doctrine's pur-
poses. 171 Once the federal court categorizes the prisoner's
claims, exercising its discretion does not require the blind rigid-
ity,172 insincere reliance on legal fictions,173 or unsupported
passiveness 74 on which the present federal court approaches
rely. If the situational guidelines fail to account for the exhaus-
tion doctrine's foundational purposes, however, due to the
unique circumstances of a particular case, the federal court re-
tains the discretionary power and flexibility to deviate from the
guidelines in order to compensate for those unique
circumstances.1 75
B. DETERmIuNG THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE: CASE STUnmms
The proposed balancing approach would lead to the same
outcomes as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits reached in Richard-
son v. Procunier17 6 and Dolny v. Erickson,177 but would provide
a stronger basis for the results. In Richardson, the prisoner's
claim concerned an illegal arrest, implicating the conduct of the
state's law enforcement officers.178 Instead of mechanically dis-
missing the prisoner's claims for failing to jump through the
proper procedural hoops, the court should have justified its deci-
sion on the basis that the state court's interest in exercising its
supervisory role over state judicial and law enforcement officers
exceeded the prisoner's interest in speedy relief and the judici-
ary's interest in efficiency. 179
In Dolny, by contrast, the Eighth Circuit recognized that
state courts have no interest in "fruitless and burdensome peti-
171. See supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text (discussing underlying
purposes of the exhaustion doctrine).
172. See supra notes 76-88, 106-130 and accompanying text (discussing and
critiquing rigid approach).
173. See supra notes 92-93, 131-139 and accompanying text (discussing and
critiquing cosmetic approach).
174. See supra notes 94-100, 140-152 and accompanying text (discussing
and critiquing passive approach).
175. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's recognition of federal courts' power to exercise discretion).
176. 762 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 76-91, 106-130 and accom-
panying text (discussing rigid approach adopted in Richardson).
177. 32 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995); see
supra notes 95-101, 140-152 and accompanying text (discussing passive ap-
proach adopted in Dolny).
178. See supra note 2 (describing Richardson's claims).
179. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text (discussing cases in-
volving state official misconduct in which state interests outweigh federal
court's and prisoner's interests).
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tions." s0 Under the proposed test, however, the court would
have acknowledged that state remedies were presumptively not
exhausted because the prisoner failed to petition the state
supreme court for discretionary review.18 ' Nonetheless, under
the proposed rule, the court should have exercised its discretion
to hear the case because the state's interest was slight and the
claim did not contest state law or judicial misconduct.38 2 In ad-
dition, because the petition concerned only federal law,L83 the
court would have decided to hear the case in order to avoid ex-
penditure of additional state court costs and possible duplication
of federal court efforts.' 84 Finally, the court would have recog-
nized the prisoner's interest in having the claim resolved as
quickly as possible in order to conserve the prisoner's personal
resources, 8 5 avoid potential procedural defaults in state
court,' 8 6 and, most importantly, obtain potential relief.'8 7
In short, the proposed approach would mark a significant
improvement over each of the current federal circuit approaches.
The proposed approach would appropriately recognize federal
courts' discretion, unlike the Third and Sixth Circuits' cosmetic
approach.' 88 Moreover, the proposed analysis would also im-
prove judicial efficiency and respect state courts more than the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits' rigid approach. 8 9 Finally, the pro-
posed analysis would not allow petitioners to bypass state
180. Dolny, 32 F.3d at 384; see also supra notes 109-121 and accompanying
text (discussing lack of state interest in returned habeas petitions).
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (stating that federal courts
should presume state remedies are unexhausted when prisoner has not filed for
discretionary state court review).
182. Dolny, 32 F.3d at 382-83. The prisoner based his collateral attack on
the relationship between the Constitution and a federal rule of evidence, not
state law. Id. at 385-86.
183. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text (discussing weight of
interests involved in petitions concerning solely federal law issues).
184. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing federal and
state courts' interest in judicial efficiency).
185. See supra notes 46,48, 123-126 and accompanying text (discussing lim-
ited resources of state prisoners and burdens imposed by time-consuming
appeals).
186. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
default doctrine).
187. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing prisoner's per-
ceived likelihood of relief in federal court compared with state court).
188. See supra notes 92-93, 131-139 and accompanying text (discussing and
critiquing cosmetic approach).
189. See supra notes 76-88, 106-130 and accompanying text (discussing and
critiquing rigid approach).
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supreme courts carte blanche, as the Eighth Circuit's laissez-
faire approach does.190
CONCLUSION
The circuit courts' attempts to create a process for determin-
ing whether to hear a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas
relief has resulted in confusion. This confusion, in turn, results
in some federal courts discouraging prisoners from petitioning
the state's supreme court for discretionary review and other fed-
eral courts requiring prisoners to return to state courts and risk
procedural default. Most importantly, the federal courts' ap-
proaches fail to promote the foundational purposes of the ex-
haustion doctrine.
Directing federal courts to exercise guided discretion by an-
alyzing the situational pattern of prisoners' petitions and bal-
ancing the interests involved will improve the handling of state
prisoners' habeas petitions. This analysis will result in more
consistent interpretations of the exhaustion doctrine among fed-
eral courts, thereby reducing the inconsistent treatment of state
prisoners. Most importantly, the proposed rule fulfills the basic
principles of the exhaustion doctrine, reaffirms the federal
courts' flexibility, and promotes judicial efficiency in both federal
and state courts.
190. See supra notes 95-100, 140-152 and accompanying text (discussing
and critiquing passive approach).
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